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ARBITRATION OF NURSING HOME CLAIMS: 
OKLAHOMA GOES ITS OWN WAY
STANLEY A. LEASURE*
I. Introduction
Rejecting the majority rule, the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Bruner v.
Timberlane Manor Ltd. Partnership unanimously ruled that provisions of
Oklahoma law precluding enforcement of an arbitration clause in a nursing
home admission contract were not preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA).   In a decision which has attracted national attention, the court1
concluded that the distribution of Medicare and Medicaid funds were not
indicia of interstate commerce, triggering application of the FAA.   This2
decision of the Oklahoma Supreme Court is contrary to holdings of the
supreme courts of Alabama, Mississippi, and Texas, all of which were
specifically rejected in Bruner.3
Bruner represents a significant limitation on the applicability of the FAA,
raising serious issues regarding the implementation of that legislation’s
purposes and benefits.  This article examines the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s
opinion in Bruner and assesses the court’s legal analysis leading to its
conclusion that the FAA was not applicable and therefore not preemptive of
Oklahoma’s anti-arbitration statute.  Preparatory to consideration of Bruner’s
application of precedent from the United States Supreme Court and Bruner’s
rejection of decisions by the supreme courts of three sister states, a review of
* Assistant Professor of Business Law, Missouri State University; J.D. University of
Tulsa College of Law, 1980; member of the Oklahoma and Arkansas State Bar Associations.
1. Bruner v. Timberlane Manor Ltd. P’ship, 2006 OK 90, 155 P.3d 16.  Section 2 of the
FAA makes an arbitral provision in a written agreement “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”  Federal
Arbitration Act § 2, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).  State law making such arbitration agreements
unenforceable is deemed preempted by the FAA in cases in which interstate commerce is
affected.  See infra text accompanying notes 87-89.
2. See Bruner, 2006 OK 90, 155 P.3d 16; see also Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration,
or in the Alternative, Motion to Assess Arbitration Fees at 6-7, Owens v. Nexion Health at
Gilmer, Inc., No. 2:06-CV-519 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 6, 2007), 2007 WL 1238431; MICHAEL S.
REEVES, ELDERCARE & NURSING HOME LITIGATION IN GEORGIA WITH FORMS § 3-5 (2007);
William M. Howard, Annotation, When Does Contract Evidence Transaction Involving
Interstate Commerce Within the Meaning of Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)—Service Contracts,
11 A.L.R. FED. 2D 233 (2006); Oklahoma High Court: Care Homes Can’t Impose Arbitration
Agreements, ANDREWS HEALTH L. LITIG. REP., Jan. 2007, at 9; Lance K. Tanaka, Determining
Contract Validity and Arbitrability, COLO. LAW., Apr. 2007, at 15, 20.
3. Bruner, ¶ 34, 155 P.3d at 29.
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the history of the relationship between the FAA and preemption under the
Supremacy Clause will be presented.  Finally, this article concludes with
thoughts regarding the potentially far reaching effects of this decision, perhaps
requiring resolution by the United States Supreme Court.
II. Bruner v. Timberlane Manor Ltd. Partnership
On June 22, 2004, Leola Bruner was admitted to the Grace Living Center
(GLC); on July 17th she was hospitalized; and on August 31st she died.  4
Detra Bruner, Mrs. Bruner’s daughter filed a wrongful death suit against GLC
seeking compensatory and punitive damages alleging negligence and violation
of the Oklahoma Nursing Home Act’s Patient Bill of Rights.   Mrs. Bruner’s5
admissions contract, however, contained an arbitration provision requiring
disputes be resolved by binding arbitration.6
In response, the nursing home moved for the dismissal of the case or,
alternatively, to compel arbitration and stay the proceedings under the FAA.  7
The nursing home claimed that the FAA operated to preempt and displace
Oklahoma’s anti-arbitration statute.   The linchpin of the defense argument8
was that the nursing home admission contract involved or affected interstate
commerce because the nursing home: received Medicare payments originating
outside Oklahoma; conformed to federal Medicare and Medicaid licensing
4. Id. ¶ 2, 155 P.3d at 19.
5. Id. ¶ 3, 155 P.3d at 19.
6. Id. ¶ 4 n.1, 155 P.3d at 19 n.1.  The arbitration provision read:
NOTICE: BY SIGNING THIS AGREEMENT THE RESIDENT AGREES TO
HAVE ANY RESIDENT/GLC [GRACE LIVING CENTER] DISPUTE
DECIDED BY NEUTRAL BINDING ARBITRATION AND WAIVES ANY
RIGHT TO TRIAL IN A COURT OF LAW OR EQUITY; PROVIDED;
HOWEVER, THAT THE PARTIES MAY RESOLVE ANY RESIDENT/GLC
DISPUTE BY NEGOTIATION BY AND BETWEEN THEMSELVES OR BY
USE OF AN AGREED UPON THIRD PARTY MEDIATOR.
Id.
7. Id. ¶ 4, 155 P.3d at 19.
8. Id. ¶ 5, 155 P.3d at 19-20.  The FAA provides:
XXA written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter
arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or
any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing
controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract.
Federal Arbitration Act § 2, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) (emphasis added); see also 63 OKLA. STAT. §
1-1939(D)-(E) (2001) (setting forth provisions regarding the waiver of rights of nursing home
residents in Oklahoma).
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rules and regulations, including inspections by out-of-state investigators;
purchased supplies from out-of-state vendors; and used instruments of
interstate commerce such as telephone lines, the internet, airlines, and the
postal service.   As such, according to the nursing home’s argument, the9
FAA  and the Oklahoma Uniform Arbitration Act  both govern the contract10 11
between the parties and the FAA is preemptive.   The trial court concluded12
that the care at issue did not involve interstate commerce and that the anti-
arbitration statute in the Oklahoma Nursing Home Care Act was therefore not
preempted.   The court determined that the Oklahoma Nursing Home Care13
Act  applied, making unenforceable the arbitration provision of the parties’14
agreement.   The defendant’s appeal came to the Oklahoma Supreme Court15
from this interlocutory order.16
The Oklahoma Supreme Court identified the following issues: (1) whether
the nursing home care of Leola Bruner involved interstate commerce; (2)
whether a strong federal interest is to be presumed when federal funds are
utilized; (3) whether Oklahoma recognizes a strong public policy favoring
arbitration agreements; and (4) whether the trial court erred in finding the
arbitral provisions unenforceable under the Oklahoma Nursing Home Care
Act.17
The court observed that the purpose of the adoption of the FAA in 1925
was to make arbitration agreements as enforceable as other contracts  and that18
its primary objective is to compel the enforcement of arbitral agreements
pertinent to transactions involving interstate commerce.   Acknowledging that19
9. Bruner, ¶ 5, 155 P.3d at 20.
10. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16.
11. 15 OKLA. STAT. §§ 801-818.
12. Bruner, ¶ 5, 155 P.3d at 20.
13. Id. ¶ 6, 155 P.3d at 20.
14. 63 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1-1901 to -1951.
15. Bruner, ¶ 6, 155 P.3d at 20; see also 63 OKLA. STAT. § 1-1939(D)-(E).  
16. Bruner, ¶ 6, 155 P.3d at 20.  The interlocutory order was appealable pursuant to 12
OKLA. STAT. § 1879 (Supp. 2005) and OKLA. SUP. CT. R. 1.60(i).
17. Bruner, ¶ 7, 155 P.3d at 20.  The plaintiff did not controvert the evidence submitted by
the defendant in support of defendant’s argument that the care involved interstate commerce
under the FAA.  Accordingly, the court ruled that the controversy presented questions of law
to be reviewed under a de novo standard, without deference to the trial court.  Id. ¶ 9, 155 P.3d
at 20.
18. Id. ¶ 11, 155 P.3d at 21 (citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388
U.S. 395, 404-05 nn.12-13 (1967)).
19. Id. (citing Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-20 (1985)).  The
“liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements” declared in the FAA was also
recognized, as was the creation of “a body of federal substantive law of arbitrability applicable
to any arbitration agreement within the coverage of the Act.”  Id. ¶ 12, 155 P.3d at 21 (citing
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the FAA has been construed to apply to all arbitration agreements entered
within the “full reach of the Commerce Clause,”  the court examined United20
States Supreme Court precedent dealing with the applicability of the FAA,
including, Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc.,  Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of21
America,  and Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson.22 23
In its analysis of Allied-Bruce Terminix, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
pointed out that the parties in that case did not contest the involvement of
interstate commerce.   In Allied-Bruce Terminix, the United States Supreme24
Court found the termite treatment in question involved interstate commerce
because Allied-Bruce and Terminix were both multi-state businesses and the
materials used came from outside Allied-Bruce’s home state.   The Oklahoma25
Supreme Court attributed the adoption of the “commerce in fact” test by the
United States Supreme Court in Allied-Bruce Terminix to the Court’s
realization that Congress, in passing the FAA, was addressing the need for
economical, expeditious, and flexible processes of dispute resolution while,
at the same time, allowing states to enact laws to protect consumers from
unfair pressure to engage in arbitration.26
In Citizens Bank, the United States Supreme Court found “involving
commerce” to be the functional equivalent of “affecting commerce,” aligning
FAA interstate commerce principles with other federal legislation under the 
Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
20. Bruner, ¶ 14, 155 P.3d at 22 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Perry v. Thomas, 482
U.S. 483, 491 (1987)).
21. 539 U.S. 52 (2003) (per curiam); see also infra Part IV.B.
22. 350 U.S. 198 (1956).  The Oklahoma Supreme Court characterized the holding in
Bernhardt as standing for the proposition that, at least with respect to an employment contract,
interstate commerce was not involved without a showing that while performing duties under the
contract the employee was working in commerce, was producing goods for commerce, or was
engaging in an activity that affected commerce.  Bruner, ¶ 15, 155 P.3d at 22-23; see also infra
notes 136-39 and accompanying text.  
23. 513 U.S. 265 (1995); see also infra Part IV.A.
24. Bruner, ¶ 17, 155 P.3d at 23.
25. Id. 
26. Id. ¶ 18, 155 P.3d at 23 (“States may regulate contracts, including arbitration clauses,
under general contract principles. . . .  What states may not do is decide that a contract is fair
enough to enforce all its basic terms (price, service, credit), but not fair enough to enforce its
arbitration clause.  The Act makes any such state policy unlawful, for that kind of policy would
place arbitration clauses on an unequal ‘footing,’ directly contrary to the Act’s language and
Congress’ intent.” (quoting Allied-Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995)) (alteration in
original)).
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol60/iss4/3
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broadest permissible exercise of the Commerce Clause power.   The issue in27
Citizens Bank was whether a debt restructuring agreement executed in
Alabama between an Alabama bank and an Alabama construction company
satisfied the “involving commerce” test, thereby triggering the FAA.   The28
United States Supreme Court concluded that it did because the commercial
loans were the underlying economic activity which the construction company
used in its business throughout the southeastern states, the restructured debt
was secured by an inventory of goods assembled from out-of-state parts and
raw materials, and commercial lending, as a general practice, has a broad
impact on the national economy which Congress may regulate pursuant to
Commerce Clause power.29
According to the Bruner court, even under the FAA, such agreements are
to be enforced according to their terms which may limit the issues to be
arbitrated and may specify the applicable arbitral rules.   Further, the court30
found that the FAA may require the party opposing arbitration to show that
Congress intended to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory
rights in issue, which can be determined by either a review of the text and
legislative history of the statute in question or by finding any inherent conflict
between arbitration and the statute’s underlying purposes.31
The Oklahoma Supreme Court also examined the Oklahoma Uniform
Arbitration Act (OUAA),  Oklahoma’s counterpart to the FAA.   According32 33
27. Id. ¶ 19, 155 P.3d at 23 (citing Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 56 (2003)
(per curiam)).
28. Id.; see also Citizens Bank, 539 U.S. at 53.
29. Bruner, ¶ 20, 155 P.3d at 24 (citing Citizens Bank, 539 U.S. 52).  The Court in Citizens
Bank instructed: “No elaborate explanation is needed to make evident the broad impact of
commercial lending on the national economy or Congress’ power to regulate that activity
pursuant to the Commerce Clause.”  Citizens Bank, 539 U.S. at 58 (“[B]anking and related
financial activities are of profound local concern. . . .  Nonetheless, it does not follow that these
same activities lack important interstate attributes.” (quoting Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc.,
447 U.S. 27 (1980)) (alteration in original)).
30. Bruner, ¶ 21, 155 P.3d at 24-25 (“Where, as here, the parties have agreed to abide by
state rules of arbitration, enforcing those rules according to the terms of the agreement is fully
consistent with the goals of the FAA, even if the result is that arbitration is stayed where the Act
would otherwise permit it to go forward.  By permitting the courts to ‘rigorously enforce’ such
agreements according to their terms, we give effect to the contractual rights and expectations
of the parties, without doing violence to the policies behind by [sic] the FAA.” (quoting Volt
Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989)) (internal
citation omitted) (alteration in original)).
31. Bruner, ¶ 22, 155 P.3d at 25 (citing Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S.
220, 226-27 (1987)).
32. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 1857(A) (Supp. 2005) (“An agreement contained in a record to
submit to arbitration any existing or subsequent controversy arising between the parties to the
agreement is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable except upon a ground that exists at law or in
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2007
742 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  60:737
to the court, the OUAA demonstrates the “clear expression of Oklahoma’s
policy favoring arbitration agreements.”   However, the court pointed out a34
conflict between section 1-1939 of the Oklahoma Nursing Home Care Act and
this provision of the OUAA, making void any purported waiver of the right to
commence an action against a nursing home and representing a “clear
rejection of arbitration agreements between nursing homes and their
residents.”   Applying the principle that the specific governs the general, the35
court ruled that the more specific Oklahoma Nursing Home Care Act,
addressing the right to commence an action with a jury trial, governed over the
more general statutory provision favoring arbitration.36
The Oklahoma high court also considered the myriad federal and state
nursing home regulations particularly pertinent.  Historically, health and
safety regulation was a local issue.   The receipt of federal funds, however,37
came with strings attached, such as requiring state regulations to conform to
federal regulations.   Pointing out that the Medicaid program in Oklahoma is38
governed by both federal law and by the Oklahoma Nursing Home Care Act
 
equity for the revocation of a contract.”).  Also, the Oklahoma Nursing Home Care Act provides
that “[a]ny waiver by a resident or his legal representative of the right to commence an action
under this section, whether oral or in writing, shall be null and void, and without legal force or
effect.”  63 OKLA. STAT. § 1-1939(D) (2001).  Additionally, the Oklahoma Nursing Home Care
Act provides that “[a]ny party to an action brought under this section shall be entitled to a trial
by jury and any waiver of the right to a trial by jury, whether oral or in writing, prior to the
commencement of an action, shall be null and void, and without legal force or effect.”  Id. § 1-
1939(E).
33. Bruner, ¶ 23, 155 P.3d at 25.
34. Id. (citing Rollings v. Thermodyne Indust., Inc., 1996 OK 6, 910 P.2d 1030; Voss v.
City of Oklahoma City, 1980 OK 148, 618 P.2d 925).
35. Id. ¶ 24, 155 P.3d at 25.
36. Id. ¶ 25, 155 P.3d at 25 (citing Hall v. Globe Life & Accident Ins. Co. of Okla., 1999
OK 89, 998 P.2d 603; Trimble v. City of Moore, 1991 OK 97, 818 P.2d 889).
37. Id. ¶ 26, 155 P.3d at 25 (citing Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs.,
Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 719 (1985)).
38. Id., ¶ 26, 155 P.3d at 25-26 (“Medicaid is a cooperative federal-state program through
which the Federal Government provides financial assistance to States so that they may furnish
medical care to needy individuals. [42 U.S.C.] § 1396.  Although participation in the program
is voluntary, the participating States must comply with certain requirements imposed by the Act
and regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (Secretary).  To
qualify for federal assistance, a State must submit to the Secretary and have approved a ‘plan
for medical assistance,’ § 1396a(a), that contains a comprehensive statement describing the
nature and scope of the State’s Medicaid program.  42 CFR § 430.10 (1989).” (quoting Wilder
v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 502 (1990)) (alteration in original)).
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol60/iss4/3
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(NHCA),  the court catalogued a number of the federal regulations applicable39
to nursing homes.40
The nursing home pointed to the applicability of the OUAA as well as the
FAA, both of which strongly favor arbitration.   The nursing home argued41
that the FAA preempts any state law hostile to arbitration and that its evidence
met the “commerce in fact” test of Allied-Bruce Terminix.   Relying on42
Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas,  McElhinney v. Medical Protective Co.,  and43 44
BCB Anesthesia Care, Ltd. v. Passavant Memorial Area Hospital Ass’n;  as45
well as state court decisions from Alabama, Mississippi, and Texas; the
nursing home urged that the indicia of interstate commerce include, perhaps
most importantly, the receipt of Medicare payments.   The court was not46
persuaded.
39. Id. ¶ 28, 155 P.3d at 27; see also 63 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1-1901 to -1964 (2001).  The
Oklahoma NHCA likewise establishes a comprehensive regulatory framework, from a state
perspective, including licensure and certification, id. § 1-1904; rights and responsibilities of
residents, id. § 1-1918; a Patients’ Bill of Rights, id. § 1-1918(B); criminalization of violation
of the Patients’ Bill of Rights with private causes of action with respect thereto, id. § 1-1918(F)-
(G); requirement of written contracts between residents and nursing homes on a general form
prescribed by the Department of Health, id. § 1-1921; liability upon the nursing home owner
and licensed administrator for intentional or negligent injury to a resident and the declaration
that a resident’s waiver of the right to commence an action against the owner or administrator
or to have a jury trial of their own be null, void and without legal effect, id. § 1-1939.
40. Bruner, ¶ 27, 155 P.3d at 26.  The court indicated that the most pertinent of these
required 
the facility to be licensed under applicable State and local law, to provide services
in compliance with all applicable Federal, State, and local laws, regulations, and
codes, and with accepted professional standards and principles that apply to
professionals providing services within such a facility, and to provide each
resident with a written statement of legal rights, including the right to file a
complaint with the State survey and certification agency concerning resident abuse
and neglect and the right to have the names and addresses of all pertinent state
client advocacy groups such as the State survey and certification agency, the State
licensure offices, the State ombudsman program, the protection and advocacy
network, and the Medicaid fraud unit.  Consistent with the federal statute
permitting the states to devise a fair mechanism for hearing appeals on transfers
and discharges of residents from nursing facilities, the appeal procedure
regulations provide that a resident has a right to agency hearings and judicial
review as allowed by law.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
41. Id. ¶ 30, 155 P.3d at 28.
42. Id. 
43. 500 U.S. 322 (1991).
44. 549 F. Supp. 121 (E.D. Ky. 1982).
45. 36 F.3d 664 (7th Cir. 1994).
46. Bruner, ¶ 31, 155 P.3d at 28.
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The Bruner court distinguished Summit Health on the basis that the Summit
Health court only mentioned Medicare payments as an allegation in the
complaint, and therefore its decision that Summit was engaged in interstate
commerce was not based upon Medicare payments.   Additionally, the47
Oklahoma Supreme Court found BCB Anesthesia Care  “inconsequential.”  48
In BCB Anesthesia Care, a group of nurse anesthetists filed their complaint
under the Sherman Act, claiming an illegal restriction of their right to practice
by an Illinois hospital.   The Seventh Circuit concluded that the receipt by the49
hospital of Medicare and Medicaid payments was sufficient to allege Sherman
Act jurisdiction, but insufficient to state a claim under the Sherman Act
itself.50
 The nursing home cited McGuffey Health & Rehabilitation Center v.
Gibson ex rel. Jackson  and Owens v. Coosa Valley Health Care, Inc.  as51 52
standing for the proposition that receipt of Medicare establishes the
connection between health care and interstate commerce relative to nursing
home operations.   McGuffey, which relied on Summit Health, Ltd. v.53
Pinhas,  BCB Anesthesia Care,  and McElhinney v. Medical Protective54 55
Co.,  held that Medicare funds moving across state lines established the56
interstate commerce connection.   The Oklahoma Supreme Court rejected the57
argument that these cases support McGuffey noting that Owens followed
McGuffey even though there was no proof of Medicare payments.   The58
Oklahoma Supreme Court also stated that the Owens court erroneously
concluded “that any doubt as to whether providing nursing home services
involved interstate commerce is put to rest by the fact that the transaction is
unquestionably economic in nature under Citizens Bank and that purely
47. Id. ¶ 32, 155 P.3d at 28 (citing Summit Health, 500 U.S. at 327-28).
48. Id. ¶ 33, 155 P.3d at 29.
49. BCB Anesthesia Care, 36 F.3d at 664-65.
50. Id. at 666 (“Although we hesitate to say that [a staffing decision at one hospital] . . . can
never state an antitrust claim, we believe that it is incumbent on the plaintiff to plead some
additional facts from which it can be inferred that the case falls within the ambit of the Sherman
Act.  Before we enlist this court in the micromanagement of the staffing arrangement at
Passavant under the aegis of the antitrust laws, we need better reasons than the plaintiffs have
given us.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original)); see
also Bruner, ¶ 32, 155 P.3d at 28.
51. 864 So. 2d 1061 (Ala. 2003); see also infra notes 163-69 and accompanying text.
52. 890 So. 2d 983 (Ala. 2004).
53. Bruner, ¶ 34, 155 P.3d at 29.
54. 500 U.S. 322 (1991).
55. 36 F.3d 664.
56. 549 F. Supp. 121 (E.D. Ky. 1982).
57. McGuffey, 864 So. 2d at 1063.
58. Bruner, ¶ 34, 155 P.3d at 29.
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intrastate economic or commercial transactions can be within the reach of the
Commerce Clause.”   The nursing home also placed significant reliance on59
Vicksburg Partners, L.P. v. Stephens  and its extension of Citizens Bank to60
nursing home contracts.   The Oklahoma Supreme Court distinguished61
Vicksburg Partners on the basis that the nursing home operators in that case
included corporations domiciled in Georgia, Tennessee, and Louisiana.  62
Lastly, the court dispatched the nursing home’s reliance on In re Nexion
Health at Humble, Inc.,  denigrating that holding as being “summarily ruled,”63
because the Nexion Health court had held that “[b]ecause ‘commerce’ is
broadly construed, the evidence of Medicare payments . . . is sufficient to
establish interstate commerce” and that the FAA was applicable.64
The court called Medicare a “significant social security insurance program
for the welfare of the aged and the disabled,” and the court recognized
Medicaid as “a significant medical program carried out by the states for the
welfare of the needy.”   It pointed out that Congress “has not declared the65
Medicare or Medicaid programs to be economic activity” subject to regulation
under the Commerce Clause.   The court also pointed out that “[t]he United66
States Supreme Court has not decided that Medicare or Medicaid funding is
an exercise of Congress’ Commerce Clause power, nor . . . that such payments
are indicative of interstate commerce.”   The Oklahoma Supreme Court67
explicitly rejected the holdings of the supreme courts of Alabama, Mississippi,
and Texas treating the federal distribution of Medicare funds and state
distribution of Medicaid funds “as indicia of commerce that triggers the
FAA.”68
The Oklahoma Supreme Court seemed to place significant emphasis on the
fact that the parties selected Oklahoma law to govern the arbitral provisions.  69
In addition, it pointed out that the arbitral agreement failed to mention the
FAA.   The court referred to the fact that the agreement provided that the70
arbitration provisions were to be governed by Oklahoma law in at least eight
59. Id.
60. Vicksburg Partners, L.P. v. Stephens, 911 So. 2d 507 (Miss. 2005); see also infra notes
170-80 and accompanying text.
61. Bruner, ¶ 35, 155 P.3d at 29.
62. Id.
63. 173 S.W.3d 67 (Tex. 2005); see also infra text accompanying notes 181-88.
64. Bruner, ¶ 36, 155 P.3d at 29 (quoting Nexion Health, 173 S.W.3d at 69).
65. Id. ¶ 37, 155 P.3d at 29.
66. Id.
67. Id. ¶ 37, 155 P.3d at 29-30.
68. Id. ¶ 37, 155 P.3d at 30.
69. Id. ¶ 40, 155 P.3d at 30.
70. Id.
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separate places.   As a result, the enforcement of that agreement under71
Oklahoma law was found consistent with the FAA even though enforcement
would not result in an arbitral proceeding otherwise permitted under the
federal statutory provisions.72
The court found evidence that some nursing home transactions affected
interstate commerce insufficient to preempt Oklahoma law, given that the
patient was an Oklahoma resident and the defendant an Oklahoma limited
partnership with its principal place of business in Oklahoma operating under
a Oklahoma license.   The court said the admission contract involved a73
“profoundly local transaction—in-state nursing home care provided to an
Oklahoma individual by an Oklahoma entity licensed under Oklahoma law.”  74
The court observed that under Citizens Bank, “[t]he FAA reaches arbitration
agreements in contracts evidencing a transaction that is (1) economic activity,
71. Id.  The court described the important provisions of the agreement relating to Oklahoma
law, noting: 
XXAny claim or controversy “shall be determined by submission to neutral,
binding arbitration pursuant to the guidelines and requirements promulgated in the
laws of the State of Oklahoma and subject to appropriate judicial review of
arbitration proceedings as authorized by Oklahoma law.”
XX“Oklahoma law, as well as the decisions of the United States Supreme Court,
favor the enforcement of valid arbitration provisions . . . [and any] dispute shall
be resolved by binding arbitration, which shall be conducted by a neutral arbitrator
selected in accordance with the arbitration guidelines and requirements provided
under Oklahoma law.”  
XXAny award or “assessment of costs and attorney’s fees to be in accordance with
the laws of the State of Oklahoma as govern the nature and/or type of claim,
controversy, dispute or disagreement in issue.” 
XX“The arbitrator(s) shall conduct the arbitration under the guidelines and
requirements set forth in the laws of the State of Oklahoma. . . .  In the event there
is a discrepancy between the arbitration administrative service rules, or other
arbitration administrator rules, and the requirements set forth in the laws of the
state of Oklahoma, the requirements set forth in the laws of the State of Oklahoma
shall control.”
XX“The arbitrator may award any remedies allowable by law, and shall comply
with the laws of the State of Oklahoma in determining said remedies.” 
Id. ¶ 40 n.24, 155 P.3d at 30 n.24 (emphasis omitted) (alterations in original).
72. Id. ¶ 41, 155 P.3d at 30.  The court noted:
Enforcement of the arbitration agreement under Oklahoma law is also fully
consistent with the federal nursing home regulation’s deference to state procedural
law.  Under Oklahoma law, § 1-1939 of the NHCA specifically addressing the
right to commence an action and to have a jury trial must govern over § 1859 of
the OUAA generally requiring the enforcement of arbitration agreements.
Id. (citing Hall v. Globe Life & Accident Ins. Co. of Okla., 1999 OK 89, 998 P.2d 603).  
73. Id. ¶ 42, 155 P.3d at 31.
74. Id. ¶ 43, 155 P.3d at 31. 
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(2) which in aggregate is a general practice subject to control under the
Commerce Clause, and (3) which in aggregate has a substantial impact on
interstate commerce.”   Obviously nursing home care for a fee is an economic75
activity, but the court held that this case failed the second and third prongs of
the test.   76
With respect to the second prong, the court determined that the local
economic activity must be subject to Congress’ Commerce Clause power.  77
While acknowledging that “Congress exercises control over the local activity
of delivery of care and treatment to residents in nursing homes” through
Medicare and Medicaid, the court emphasized that these statutes were passed
through the exercise of Congress’ Spending Clause power rather than the
Commerce Clause power.   Nothing in these statutes indicated a78
congressional finding of overriding national concern and substantial interstate
commerce connection, or evidence of intent “to take nursing home care out of
the health and safety local concern category and place nursing home care in
the interstate commerce category.”   With respect to the third prong, the court79
said neither the distribution of Medicare funds by a federal agency nor
distribution of Medicaid funds by a state agency evidence an effect on
interstate commerce subject to federal control under the Commerce Clause.  80
The court found the evidence of impact on interstate commerce de minimus.81
The court concluded that even if the admission contract fell within the
reach of the Commerce Clause, the FAA’s mandate was overridden by federal
statutory provisions permitting states to develop mechanisms for hearing
appeals on transfers and discharges of patients from nursing home facilities,82
and by virtue of federal regulations permitting appeal procedures, hearings
and judicial review as allowed by state law.   The court summarized the basis83
for its decision in four points:
75. Id.
76. Id. 
77. Id. ¶ 44, 155 P.3d at 31.
78. Id. (citing Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 356 (1992)). 
79. Id. (citing Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 156 (1971)).
80. Id. ¶ 45, 155 P.3d at 31.
81. Id. (citing Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 188, 196 (1968), overruled by Nat’l League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)).  The purchasing of supplies out-of-state and the use of
long-distance telephone lines and internet did “not demonstrate a substantial impact on interstate
commerce,” and the court found them to be “insufficient to impress interstate commerce
regulation upon the admission contract for residential care between [an] Oklahoma nursing
home and [an] Oklahoma resident patient.”  Id.
82. Id. ¶ 46, 155 P.3d at 31; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(c)(2) & (f)(3) (2000) (describing
rights of residents regarding transfers and discharges, and setting up appellate procedures).
83. Bruner, ¶ 46, 155 P.3d at 31; see also 42 C.F.R. § 431.245 (2007).
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First, the arbitration agreement calls for Oklahoma law to govern. 
Second, Congress regulates nursing homes through its spending
power rather than its power over interstate commerce.  Third,
Congress, in its nursing home regulations, left the states to devise
the appropriate administrative or judicial review of nursing home
residents’ claims against nursing homes.  Fourth, the evidence in
this case is insufficient to connect the nursing home admission
contract with interstate commerce under extant jurisprudence from
the United States Supreme Court.84
III. Brief History of the FAA and Preemption
Before considering the precedent from the United States Supreme Court
and the high courts of three sister states as applied by the Bruner court, a
review of the relationship between the FAA and preemption under the
Supremacy Clause will be useful.  Congress passed the FAA in 1925 in
response to the persistent enmity of the courts toward enforcement of arbitral
provisions and the political pressure brought to bear by the business
community which was desirous of assuring the viability of such agreements.  85
The passage of the FAA evinced a strong national policy favoring arbitration
as a means of dispute resolution which was considered quicker, cheaper, and
simpler than litigation, with the added benefit of relieving congestion in the
courts.   To accomplish these purposes, the FAA deemed written arbitral86
provisions within its scope (maritime transactions or contracts evidencing a
transaction involving commerce) valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, except
to the extent any contractual provision would be deemed unenforceable at law
or in equity.   In addition, it established enforcement mechanisms authorizing87
84. Bruner, ¶ 47, 155 P.3d at 32.
85. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 111 (2001); Sarah Rudolph Cole,
Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements
Between Employers and Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV. 449, 467 (1996).
86. Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 280 (1995); Moses H. Cone
Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,
417 U.S. 506, 510-11 (1974); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395,
404 (1967); Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d 1359, 1367 (11th Cir. 2005);
Hoffman v. Cargill Inc., 236 F.3d 458, 461 (8th Cir. 2001); Dobbins v. Hawk’s Enters., 198
F.3d 715, 717 (8th Cir. 1999).
87. The FAA specifically states: 
XXA written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter
arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or
any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol60/iss4/3
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the entry of orders staying litigation and compelling arbitration.   Commerce,88
in the FAA sense, was defined as “commerce among the several States” but
excluding “contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any
other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”89
As previously discussed, the question in Bruner centered on preemption of
Oklahoma statutory law precluding the right to enforce the arbitration
provision in question under the Federal Constitution’s Supremacy Clause.  90
Nothing in the FAA expressly preempts state law; preemption, in this context,
arises by virtue of the implied conflict between the state regulation of
arbitration and the FAA such that the state regulation imposes an “obstacle to
 
controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract.
9 U.S.C. § 2.
88. The FAA provides:
XXIf any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States
upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such
arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the
issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an
agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action
until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement,
providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such
arbitration.
9 U.S.C. § 3.  Further, the FAA also provides: 
XXA party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to
arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United States
district court which, save for such agreement, would have jurisdiction under title
28, in a civil action or in admiralty of the subject matter of a suit arising out of the
controversy between the parties, for an order directing that such arbitration
proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement. . . .  The court shall hear
the parties, and upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for
arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall make
an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms
of the agreement. . . .  If the making of the arbitration agreement or the failure,
neglect, or refusal to perform the same be in issue, the court shall proceed
summarily to the trial thereof.  If no jury trial be demanded by the party alleged
to be in default, or if the matter in dispute is within admiralty jurisdiction, the
court shall hear and determine such issue. . . .  If the jury find that an agreement
for arbitration was made in writing and that there is a default in proceeding
thereunder, the court shall make an order summarily directing the parties to
proceed with the arbitration in accordance to the terms thereof.
9 U.S.C. § 4.
89. 9 U.S.C. § 1.
90. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.; Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24.
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the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.”91
In a line of cases beginning in 1967 with Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood &
Conklin Manufacturing Co.,  the United States Supreme Court has delineated92
the reach of the FAA and its relationship to state law.  In Prima Paint, the
plaintiffs sued to rescind the parties’ contract and stay arbitration, claiming
that the contract was fraudulently induced.   Flood & Conklin argued that the93
question of fraud in the inducement was one for the arbitrator and not the
federal court; the Second Circuit agreed.   The Supreme Court found the94
question of whether the federal court or the arbitrators should resolve the issue
regarding fraudulent inducement to be explicitly answered by section 4 of the
FAA.   According to the Court, a federal court is required to make the95
decision if the claim related to fraud in the inducement of the arbitration
clause, but to defer to the arbitrators in circumstances as presented in Prima
Paint where the claim related to fraud in the inducement of the entire
contract.96
Having determined in Prima Paint that the federal courts are bound by the
FAA in diversity cases, the United States Supreme Court in Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp. took the first steps in the
analysis of whether state courts are similarly bound.   Cone Memorial97
Hospital and Mercury Construction entered into a construction contract
containing graduated steps of alternative dispute resolution.   A dispute arose98
91. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
92. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
93. Id. at 398.
94. Id. at 399-400.
95. Id. at 403.  The Court also noted:
The question in this case, however, is not whether Congress may fashion federal
substantive rules to govern questions arising in simple diversity cases.  Rather, the
question is whether Congress may prescribe how federal courts are to conduct
themselves with respect to subject matter over which Congress plainly has power
to legislate.  The answer to that can only be in the affirmative.  And it is clear
beyond dispute that the federal arbitration statute is based upon and confined to
the incontestable federal foundations of control over interstate commerce and over
admiralty.
Id. at 405 (internal citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
96. Id. at 404.
97. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
98. Id. at 4-5.  The arbitration provision in question provided in pertinent part: 
All claims, disputes and other matters in question arising out of, or relating to, this
Contract or the breach thereof, . . . shall be decided by arbitration in accordance
with the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration
Association then obtaining unless the parties mutually agree otherwise.  This
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between the hospital and the contractor resulting in the filing of suit by the
hospital in state court contending that the contractor’s claims were without
merit and barred by the statute of limitations.   The hospital further claimed99
that Mercury Construction had waived its right to arbitration.  100
Simultaneously, Mercury Construction served its demand for arbitration and
filed suit in United States District Court, seeking an order compelling
arbitration under the FAA.101
The district court stayed the federal litigation pending resolution of the
hospital’s state court action.   The district court’s stay order was reversed by102
the Fourth Circuit, which remanded the case with instructions to enter an order
to arbitrate.   On appeal, the Supreme Court determined the FAA to be the103
governing law, regardless of whether it was raised in state or federal court.  104
The Court also held that the FAA created a body of substantive federal law
applicable to all arbitration agreements within the scope of the FAA’s
coverage.105
Any doubt left by the holding in Moses H. Cone as to the applicability of
the FAA to litigation in state courts was resolved in Southland Corp. v.
Keating.   Southland and several of its franchisees became embroiled in a106
dispute in which the franchisees alleged fraud, misrepresentation, breach of
contract, and violation of the California Franchise Investment Law (CFIL),
resulting in suits being filed against Southland in California state court.   The107
franchise agreement contained an arbitration provision.108
After consolidation of a number of the suits, the state court granted
Southland’s request for an order compelling arbitration with respect to all
agreement to arbitrate shall be specifically enforceable under the prevailing
arbitration law.  The award rendered by the arbitrators shall be final, and judgment
may be entered upon it in accordance with applicable law in any court having
jurisdiction thereof.
Id. at 5.




103. Id. at 8.
104. Id. at 24 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000)).
105. Id.
106. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
107. Id. 
108. Id.  The franchise agreement’s arbitration provision provided in pertinent part: “Any
controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement or the breach thereof shall be
settled by arbitration in accordance with the Rules of the American Arbitration Association . . .
and judgment upon any award rendered by the arbitrator may be entered in any court having
jurisdiction hereof.”  Id. (alteration in original).
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claims except those based on CFIL.   Southland appealed the denial of its109
request for an order compelling arbitration of the statutory claims.   The110
California Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that CFIL did not invalidate
the parties’ agreement to arbitrate.   Alternatively, the court commented that111
if the statute did purport to make the arbitration agreement (in interstate
commerce) unenforceable, it would be contrary to section 2 of the FAA and
invalid under the Supremacy Clause.   The California Supreme Court112
reversed the court of appeals and declared that the CFIL required judicial
consideration of such claims and that the statute did not violate the FAA.113
Accepting the construction by the California Supreme Court of the CFIL
as requiring judicial consideration of claims invalidating contractual
agreements to arbitrate, the United States Supreme Court held that the statute
conflicted with section 2 of the FAA, violated the Supremacy Clause, and was
void.   The Court noted that the national policy favoring arbitration had been114
declared by Congress which “withdrew the power of the states to require a
judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed
to resolve by arbitration.”   The Court instructed that the foundation of the115
FAA was the authority of Congress to enact substantive rules pursuant to the
Commerce Clause.   The Court also referred to its holding in Moses H. Cone116
on the issue of arbitrability as a question of federal substantive law: “Federal
law in the terms of the Arbitration Act governs that issue in either state or
federal court.”   The intent of Congress, according to the Court, was to117
preclude state legislative efforts to thwart enforcement of arbitral
provisions.118
109. Id. at 4.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 5.  The California Franchise Investment Law states: “Any condition, stipulation
or provision purporting to bind any person acquiring any franchise to waive compliance with
any provision of this law or any rule or order hereunder is void.”  CAL. CORP. CODE § 31512
(West 1977), recognized as preempted in Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d
393 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
112. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 5.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 10.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 11 (citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967)).
117. Id. at 12 (citing Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1983)).
118. Id. at 16.
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IV. United States Supreme Court Precedent Applied in Bruner
In reaching its decision that the provisions of Oklahoma law precluding
enforcement of an arbitration clause in a nursing home admission contract
were not preempted by the FAA, the Oklahoma Supreme Court examined and
applied the holdings of the United States Supreme Court in two major cases: 
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson  and Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc.119 120
In Allied-Bruce Terminix, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the
provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act calling for the enforcement of
arbitral provisions “evidencing a transaction involving commerce” extends the
reach of the FAA to the limits of the power of Congress to regulate commerce
under the Commerce Clause.   In Citizens Bank, the United States Supreme121
Court instructed that the term “involving commerce” contained in the FAA is
the functional equivalent of “affecting commerce.”122
A. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson
In Allied-Bruce Terminix, the trial court denied Allied-Bruce’s request for
a stay to permit arbitration and on appeal the Alabama Supreme Court upheld
the denial on the basis of an Alabama statute making such arbitration
agreements invalid and unenforceable.   The Alabama Supreme Court ruled123
the FAA inapplicable to the subject contract and, therefore, not preemptive of
the anti-arbitration provisions of Alabama law.   According to the Alabama124
Supreme Court, the FAA applied only to contracts in which the parties
“contemplated substantial interstate activity” at the time they entered into the
contract.   The court found that the transaction “contemplated” by the parties125
was primarily local and not “substantially” interstate.126
119. 513 U.S. 265 (1995). 
120. 539 U.S. 52 (2003) (per curiam); see also infra Part IV.B.
121. Allied-Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. at 268 (emphasis omitted).  Justice Breyer, writing for
the majority, summarized the issue and the Court’s holding as follows: 
XXThis case concerns the reach of § 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act.  That
section makes enforceable a written arbitration provision in “a contract evidencing
a transaction involving commerce.”  Should we read this phrase broadly, extending
the Act’s reach to the limits of Congress’ Commerce Clause power?  Or, do the
two italicized words—“involving” and “evidencing”—significantly restrict the
Act’s application?  We conclude that the broader reading of the Act is the correct
one, and we reverse a State Supreme Court judgment to the contrary.
Id. at 268-69 (internal citation omitted). 
122. Citizens Bank, 539 U.S. at 56.
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The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve conflicts
between the circuits as to the interpretation of this aspect of the FAA.   The127
Court pointed to three items of historical importance relative to the legal
issues involved: (1) the principal goal of the FAA is to compel enforcement
of agreements to arbitrate;  (2) the FAA is based upon the Commerce128
Clause;  and (3) the FAA preempts state law and state law cannot apply state129
statutes that invalidate arbitration agreements.   With this historical130
background, Justice Breyer observed:
We therefore proceed to the basic interpretive questions aware that
we are interpreting an Act that seeks broadly to overcome judicial
hostility to arbitration agreements and that applies in both federal
and state courts.  We must decide in this case whether that Act
used language about interstate commerce that nonetheless limits
the Act’s application, thereby carving out an important statutory
niche in which a State remains free to apply its antiarbitration law
or policy.  We conclude that it does not.131
The Court had previously set the boundary of the FAA as coinciding with
that of the Commerce Clause,  concluding that the term “involving132
commerce” contained in section 2 of the FAA is very broad and the functional
equivalent of “affecting commerce.”   Given the basic purpose of the FAA133
of putting arbitration provisions “on the same footing” as the other contractual
127. Id. at 269-70.  The Court recognized that a number of lower federal courts and several
state courts had adopted a similar interpretation of the FAA, id. (citing Lacheney v. ProfitKey
Int’l, Inc., 818 F. Supp. 922, 924 (E.D. Va. 1993); R.J. Palmer Constr. Co. v. Wichita Band
Instrument Co., 642 P.2d 127, 130 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982); Burke County Pub. Schs. Bd. of Educ.
v. Shaver P’ship, 279 S.E.2d 816, 822-23 (N.C. 1981)), but that a number of federal appellate
courts had interpreted the same language as reaching the limits of Congress’ power under the
Commerce Clause, id. (citing Foster v. Turley, 808 F.2d 38, 40 (10th Cir. 1986); Snyder v.
Smith, 736 F.2d 409, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1984), overruled by Felzen v. Andreas, 134 F.3d 873 (7th
Cir. 1998); Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 406-07 (2d Cir.
1959)).
128. Allied-Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. at 270 (citing Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of
Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 474 (1989)).
129. Id. at 271 (citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 405
(1967)).
130. Id. at 271-72 (citing Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1984)).
131. Id. at 272-73.
132. Id. at 274-75 (citing Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 490 (1987); Southland Corp., 465
U.S. at 14-15; Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 407; Robert Lawrence Co., 271 F.2d at 407).
133. Id. at 273-74.  The Court’s conclusion was based on the substantial equivalence of the
dictionary definitions of “involved” and “affect” as well as its conclusion that the legislative
history of the Federal Arbitration Act evinces an expansive congressional intent.  Id. at 274.
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terms, the Court in Allied-Bruce Terminix felt a robust interpretation of the
breadth of the Act’s language appropriate.   The Court found the scope of the134
FAA should expand in step with the expansion of the Commerce Clause
power.135
The Court rejected the appellees’ contention that the holding in Bernhardt
v. Polygraphic Co. of America  required a narrow interpretation of the word136
“involving”   because in Bernhardt the FAA was not applied to the subject137
contract since there was “no showing that petitioner while performing his
duties under the employment contract was working ‘in’ commerce, was
producing goods for commerce, or was engaging in activity that affected
commerce, within the meaning of our decisions.”    As a result, the Court138
concluded that in Bernhardt the words “involving commerce” were interpreted
as broadly as the words “affecting commerce,” meaning a full exercise of the
constitutional power.139
The next interpretive task undertaken was to determine the meaning of the
words “evidencing a transaction” in that portion of 9 U.S.C. § 2 which
provides for the applicability of § 2 in situations in which there is “a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce.”   The issue was whether140
“evidencing a transaction” requires that the transaction in fact involve
interstate commerce.   The Court acknowledged that the Alabama Supreme141
Court and others followed the more expansive view espoused by the Second
Circuit in Metro Industrial Painting Corp. v. Terminal Construction Co.  142
Recognizing the choice to be difficult, the Supreme Court rejected the
“contemplation of the parties” interpretation and adopted the “commerce in
134. Id. at 275 (citing Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974)).
135. Id. (citing McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 241 (1980);
Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 743 n.2 (1976)).
136. 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
137. Allied-Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. at 277.
138. Id. at 276-77 (citing Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 200-01).
139. Id. at 277.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. 287 F.2d 382 (2d Cir. 1961).  According to the Second Circuit: 
XXThe significant question . . . is not whether, in carrying out the terms of the
contract, the parties did cross state lines, but whether, at the time they entered into
it and accepted the arbitration clause, they contemplated substantial interstate
activity.  Cogent evidence regarding their state of mind at the time would be the
terms of the contract, and if it, on its face, evidences interstate traffic . . . the
contract should come within § 2.  In addition, evidence as to how the parties
expected the contract to be performed and how it was performed is relevant to
whether substantial interstate activity was contemplated.
Id. at 387 (Lumbard, C.J., concurring).
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fact” view, holding that the former view would foster litigation over the
contemplation of the parties, a result Congress could not intend with respect
to an Act designed to reduce the costs and delay of litigation.143
The Court emphasized that states were free to protect consumers against
unfair pressure to agree to arbitral provisions in their contracts under the
express provisions of the FAA allowing invalidation of arbitration clauses on
grounds applicable to any contractual provision.   The Act does prohibit the144
states from vitiating an arbitration clause while enforcing the remainder of the
contract.   As such, the “commerce in fact” test interprets the language of the145
FAA as requiring that the transaction involve interstate commerce even if the
parties never specifically considered that issue.146
B. Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc.
As described in the per curiam opinion, the issue in Citizens Bank v.
Alafabco, Inc. was “whether the parties’ debt-restructuring agreement is ‘a
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce’ within the meaning of
the Federal Arbitration Act.”   Reversing the decision of the Alabama147
Supreme Court, the Court determined that the arbitration clauses were
enforceable under the FAA.148
A series of loans were made by Citizens Bank to Alafabco.   The loans149
became delinquent and the parties attempted to restructure the outstanding
indebtedness.   As part of the documentation of the debt restructuring,150
Citizens Bank entered into an arbitration agreement with Alafabco.  151
Subsequently, Alafabco suffered significant business reversals and sued
Citizens Bank in Alabama state court under numerous theories including
breach of contract, fraud, and interference with a business relationship.   The152
trial court, in response to the bank’s motion, ordered arbitration pursuant to
the terms of the agreement between the parties.   The Alabama Supreme153
143. Allied-Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. at 278-79.
144. Id. at 281.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 53 (2003) (per curiam).
148. Id.
149. Id. 
150. Id. at 53-54.
151. Id. at 54.  The arbitral provisions covered “all disputes, claims, or controversies” and
provided that the FAA “shall apply to [its] construction, interpretation, and enforcement.”  Id.
(quoting Alfabaco, Inc. v. Citizens Bank, 872 So. 2d 798, 799 (Ala. 2002)) (internal quotation
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Court reversed, ruling that the FAA was inapplicable because there was an
insufficient connection between the dispute and interstate commerce.   The154
Alabama Supreme Court found no evidence that the debt was attributable to
interstate transactions, that the funds constituting the debt originated outside
of Alabama, or that the debt was attributable to an out-of-state project.   On155
review, the United States Supreme Court concluded that the state high court
had given an overly narrow view of the FAA’s “involving commerce”
language in construing it to necessitate that the contract in question must alone
have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.   The Court indicated that156
in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson,  it had given that term a more157
expansive reading, signaling the broadest permissible exercise by Congress of
the Commerce Clause power.   As such, the Alabama Supreme Court erred158
in requiring that the restructured debt of Alafabco be attributable to interstate
transactions, originate outside Alabama, or be inseparable from out-of-state
projects.   Since the Court had determined that the FAA was not restricted159
to transactions actually “in commerce,” such findings were unnecessary.  160
Furthermore, since the economic activity in question, in the aggregate,
constitutes “a general practice . . . subject to federal control,” the fact that the
individual Alafabco debt restructuring transactions, in isolation, had no
substantial effect on interstate commerce was not determinative.  161
Notwithstanding the fact that the contracts were executed in Alabama by
Alabamans, the Court found that they met the “involving commerce” test
because: (1) “Alafabco engaged in business throughout the southeastern
United States using substantial loans from [Citizens Bank] that were
renegotiated and redocumented in the debt-restructuring agreements”; (2) the
debt was secured by all of Alafabco’s assets, including inventory assembled
from out-of-state parts and raw materials; and (3) commercial lending, as
presented in Citizens Bank, has a broad impact on the national economy
invoking the power of Congress to regulate it under the Commerce Clause.162
154. Id. at 55.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 56-57.
157. 513 U.S. 265, 273-74 (1995).
158. Citizens Bank, 539 U.S. at 56.
159. Id.
160. Id. (citing Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 195-96 (1974)).
161. Id. at 56-57 (quoting Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S.
219, 236 (1948)) (alteration in original).
162. Id. at 57-58 (citing Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 38-39 (1980);
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304-05 (1964); Mandeville Island Farms, 334 U.S. at
236).
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V. Jurisprudence of Sister States Rejected in Bruner
McGuffey Health & Rehabilitation Center v. Gibson ex rel. Jackson
involved a medical malpractice action against an Alabama nursing home.  163
The admission agreement contained an arbitration clause compelling
arbitration.   If the admission agreement evidenced a transaction164
substantially affecting interstate commerce, the arbitration provision would be
enforceable according to the Alabama Supreme Court.165
Medicare and Medicaid paid funds to the nursing home for Gibson’s care
and treatment.   The Medicare funds came from the federal government166
through an insurance company located in Omaha, Nebraska and then to the
nursing home in Alabama.   Identifying the issue as one of first impression,167
the state court held that Medicare funds moving across state lines should be
considered in determining whether the admission agreement had a substantial
effect on interstate commerce.   The court said that the admission agreement168
had a substantial effect on interstate commerce because the majority of the
funds received by the nursing home for the care of Gibson came from out-of-
state and that goods were purchased from out-of-state vendors to feed Gibson,
provide her bedding, and keep her surroundings clean.169
The Supreme Court of Mississippi faced a similar issue and reached a
similar result in Vicksburg Partners, L.P. v. Stephens.   The nursing home170
admissions agreement in that case contained a broad arbitration clause.   The 171
163. 864 So. 2d 1061, 1061 (Ala. 2003). 
164. Id. at 1062.
165. Id.




170. 911 So. 2d 507 (Miss. 2005).
171. Id. at 510.  The arbitration clause provided:
The Patient and Responsible Party agree that any and all claims, dispute and/or
controversies between them and the Facility shall be resolved by binding
arbitration administered by the American Arbitration Association.  The Arbitration
shall be heard and decided by one qualified Arbitrator selected by the Facility. 
The Parties agree that the decision of the Arbitrator shall be final.  All Parties
hereto agree to arbitration for their individual respective anticipated benefit of
reduced costs of pursuing resolution of a claim, dispute or controversy, should one
arise.  All Parties hereto are hereby waiving all rights to a jural trial.
Id.  In addition, immediately above the signature lines, the following notice appeared: “THE
UNDERSIGNED ACKNOWLEDGE THAT EACH OF THEM HAS READ AND
UNDERSTOOD THIS AGREEMENT, INCLUDING THE ARBITRATION PROVISION
AND HAS RECEIVED A COPY OF THIS AGREEMENT, AND THAT EACH OF THEM
VOLUNTARILY CONSENTS TO AND ACCEPTS ALL OF ITS TERMS AND
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol60/iss4/3
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plaintiff filed suit against the nursing home defendants alleging, inter alia,
negligence, medical malpractice, fraud, and wrongful death.   The172
defendants asked the trial court to stay the litigation and enforce the
arbitration provisions of the admission agreement.  The trial court denied this
request, prompting the Mississippi Supreme Court to grant an interlocutory
appeal.   The Mississippi high court noted arbitration’s favored status under173
Mississippi law.   Relying on Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson  and174 175
Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc.,  the court, without apparent hesitation, found176
that the instant case fell within the “broad purview” of the FAA since
admission agreements of nursing homes, taken in the aggregate, affect
interstate commerce and under the broad language of Citizens Bank “[o]nly
the general practice need bear on interstate commerce in a substantial way.”  177
The court noted that the routine operation of receiving supplies from out-of-
CONDITIONS.”  Id.
XXSubsequently, the parties executed another arbitration agreement which provided: 
The Resident and Responsible Party agree that any and all claims and/or
controversies between them and the Facility or its Owners, officers, directors or
employees shall be resolved by binding arbitration administered by the American
Arbitration Association and its rules and procedures.  The Arbitration shall be
heard and decided by one qualified Arbitrator selected by mutual agreement of the
parties.  Failing such agreement each party shall select one qualified Arbitrator
and the two selected shall select a third.  The Parties agree that the decision of the
Arbitrator(s) shall be final.  The Parties further agree that the Arbitrators shall
have all authority necessary to render a final, binding decision of all claims and/or
controversies and shall have all requisite powers and obligations.  If the agreed
method of selecting an Arbitrator(s) fails for any reason or the Arbitrator(s)
appointed fails or is unable to act or the successor(s) has not been duly appointed,
the appropriate circuit court, on application of a party, shall appoint one Arbitrator
to arbitrate the issue.  An Arbitrator so appointed shall have all the powers of the
one named in this Agreement.  All Parties hereto agree to arbitration for their
individual respective anticipated benefit of reduced costs of pursuing a timely
resolution of a claim, dispute or controversy, should one arise.  The Parties agree
to share equally the costs of such arbitration regardless of the outcome.  Consistent
with the terms and conditions of this Agreement, the Parties agree that the
Arbitrator(s) may not award punitive damages and actual damages awarded, if any,
shall be awarded pursuant to Section E.7.
Id. at 510-11.
172. Id. at 511-12.
173. Id. at 512.
174. Id. at 513 (citing Pass Termite & Pest Control, Inc. v. Walker, 904 So. 2d 1030, 1032-
33 (Miss. 2004)).
175. 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
176. 539 U.S. 52 (2003) (per curiam).
177. Vicksburg Partners, 911 So. 2d at 515 (citing  Citizens Bank, 539 U.S. at 57) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original).
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state vendors and payments from out-of-state insurance companies and the
federal Medicare program affect interstate commerce.   The court178
specifically observed that the defendants consisted of corporations from
Georgia, Tennessee, and Louisiana, and that Vicksburg Partners receives
services and goods from out-of-state vendors, takes in out-of-state residents,
and receives payments from out-of-state insurance carriers including Medicare
and Medicaid.   This required the parties to “undertake arbitration as agreed179
and avail themselves of the federally endorsed and substantively benign
arbitration clause contained in the body of their contract.”180
The issue of the enforceability of arbitration agreements in nursing home
contracts was also addressed by the Supreme Court of Texas in the case of In
re Nexion Health at Humble, Inc. decided in 2005.   The Texas Supreme181
Court joined the high courts of Alabama and Mississippi in holding that the
transfer of Medicare funds across state lines constituted interstate commerce
evoking application of the FAA, thereby preempting certain provisions of the
Texas Arbitration Act.   A patient was admitted to Humble Healthcare182
Center under an admission agreement containing an arbitration provision.  183
The patient died and his wife filed a wrongful death action against the nursing
home.   The trial court rejected the nursing home’s request that it order184
arbitration.   On appeal, the plaintiff contended that there was insufficient185
evidence of interstate commerce to invoke application of the FAA.   The186
Texas Supreme Court held that the FAA “extends to any contract affecting
commerce, as far as the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution
will reach.”   According to the Texas Supreme Court, Medicare payments187
made to the defendant on behalf of the deceased were sufficient to establish
interstate commerce.188
VI. Selection of Oklahoma Law in Bruner
In Bruner, the Oklahoma Supreme Court opted not to follow its Alabama,
Mississippi, and Texas counterparts, and instead, placed great importance on
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 526.
181. In re Nexion Health at Humble, Inc., 173 S.W.3d 67, 67 (Tex. 2005).
182. Id. at 69.
183. Id. at 68.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 69.
187. Id. (citing In re L&L Kempwood Assocs., 9 S.W.3d 125, 127 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam)).
188. Id.
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the choice of law provisions in the admissions contract.  Relying on Volt
Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior
University,  the court declared that under the FAA, arbitration agreements189
are to be enforced according to their terms, even when they limit the issues to
be arbitrated.   In Volt, the parties entered into a construction contract in190
which they agreed to arbitrate.   A dispute arose and Volt demanded191
arbitration.   Stanford responded by filing suit in California state court192
alleging fraud and breach of contract and demanding indemnity from other
parties with whom it had no arbitration agreement.   In state court, Volt193
sought the entry of an order compelling arbitration.   Stanford requested that194
the arbitration be stayed pursuant to the provisions of a rule of California civil
procedure.   The trial court stayed arbitration subject to the outcome of the195
related litigation not involving parties to the arbitral agreement between Volt
and Stanford.196
On appeal, the California Court of Appeal acknowledged that the contract
involved interstate commerce, the FAA governs contracts in interstate
commerce, and the FAA contains no provision permitting a court to stay
arbitration pending resolution of related litigation involving third-parties not
bound by the arbitration agreement.   Nevertheless, the California Court of197
Appeal affirmed the decision of the trial court on the basis that the parties had
incorporated the California Rules of Arbitration (including section 1281.2(c)
of the California Civil Procedure Code) by specifying in the contract that the
agreement would be governed by “the law of the place where the project is
located . . . .”   The court also found the FAA not preemptive of this198
California procedural rule, even though the contract involved interstate
commerce.   Volt contended this was error because the court’s construction199
of the choice of law clause constituted a finding of waiver of a “federally
189. 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989).
190. Bruner v. Timberlane Manor Ltd. P’ship, 2006 OK 90, ¶ 21, 155 P.3d 16, 24-25; see
also supra text accompanying note 30.
191. Volt, 489 U.S. at 470.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 470-71.
194. Id. at 471.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 471-72.  The rule of civil procedure upon which Stanford relied in its motion to
stay arbitration was CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.2(c) (West 1982).  This rule allows a court
to stay arbitration pending the resolution of related litigation involving parties not subject to the
arbitration agreement.  Id. at 471.
198. Id. at 472 (internal quotation marks omitted).
199. Id.
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guaranteed right to compel arbitration of the parties’ dispute” to be judged by
federal law rather than state law,  and that such construction flies in the face200
of the national policy favoring arbitration established by the FAA.201
In an opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the United States
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the California Court of Appeal,
declaring that when parties to an arbitration agreement agree to abide by state
rules, the enforcement of such rules does no violence to the goals of the FAA,
even if the arbitration is stayed as a result thereof.   The Court emphasized202
that the FAA only guarantees the right to obtain an order compelling
arbitration to the extent provided in the parties’ agreement.   According to203
the Court, the decision of the California Court of Appeal was not a finding of
waiver of an FAA right, but rather a finding that, under the circumstances, no
right to arbitration existed within the ambit of section 1281.2(c) of the
California Civil Procedure Code.   The United States Supreme Court204
concluded that these principles were not violated by the California Court of
Appeal:
There is no federal policy favoring arbitration under a certain set
of procedural rules; the federal policy is simply to ensure the
enforceability, according to their terms, of private agreements to
arbitrate.  Interpreting a choice-of-law clause to make applicable
state rules governing the conduct of arbitration—rules which are
manifestly designed to encourage resort to the arbitral process—
simply does not offend the rule of liberal construction set forth in
Moses H. Cone, nor does it offend any other policy embodied in
the FAA.205
Finally, the Supreme Court held that application of the California statute
to stay arbitration was not precluded in the instant circumstances because the
parties agreed to arbitrate under California law.   The FAA does not206
expressly preempt state law and does not represent an expression of
congressional intent to occupy the entire field of arbitration, leaving nothing
for the states to regulate.   Thus, the Court instructed that state law is subject207
 
200. Id. at 474 (internal quotation marks omitted).
201. Id. at 475.
202. Id. at 479.
203. Id. at 474-75 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000)).
204. Id. at 475.
205. Id. at 476-77.
206. Id. at 476.
207. Id. at 477 (citing Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198 (1956)).
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to preemption only when it impairs the purposes and objectives of Congress
in conflict with federal law.208
In 1995, the United States Supreme Court took another opportunity to
address this issue in Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.   The209
Mastrobuonos established a brokerage account with Shearson, executing a
standard agreement.   They sued Shearson in the United States District Court210
claiming to have sustained significant damage as a result of Shearson’s
mishandling of the account.   The agreement contained two provisions211
important to the litigation: an arbitration provision and a choice of law
provision.   The district court granted Shearson’s request to stay the212
litigation and compel arbitration.   The arbitration panel awarded the213
Mastrobuonos almost $160,000 in compensatory damages and $400,000 in
punitive damages.   The district court’s vacatur of the punitive damages214
award was affirmed by the Seventh Circuit.   The choice of law provision in215
the parties’ contract directing that New York law apply (which precludes
arbitral awards of punitive damages) was the cornerstone of the disallowance
of the arbitrators’ award of punitive damages.   The Supreme Court granted216
208. Id. (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
209. 514 U.S. 52 (1995).
210. Id. at 54.
211. Id.
212. Id.  The arbitration and choice of law provisions were both contained in paragraph 13
of the agreement which provided:
This agreement shall inure to the benefit of your [Shearson’s] successors and
assigns[,] shall be binding on the undersigned, my [petitioners’] heirs, executors,
administrators and assigns, and shall be governed by the laws of the State of New
York.  Unless unenforceable due to federal or state law, any controversy arising
out of or relating to [my] accounts, to transactions with you, your officers,
directors, agents and/or employees for me or to this agreement or the breach
thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the rules then in effect,
of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. or the Boards of Directors
of the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. and/or the American Stock Exchange, Inc.
as I may elect.  If I do not make such election by registered mail addressed to you
at your main office within 5 days after demand by you that I make such election,
then you may make such election.  Judgment upon any award rendered by the
arbitrators may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof.  This
agreement to arbitrate does not apply to future disputes arising under certain of the
federal securities laws to the extent it has been determined as a matter of law that
I cannot be compelled to arbitrate such claims.
Id. at 58 n.2.
213. Id. at 54.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 54-55.  This common law rule was established in New York in Garrity v. Lyle
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certiorari to resolve a conflict between the circuits on this issue.   In217
reversing the Seventh Circuit’s decision, the Court said the issue was “what
the contract has to say about the arbitrability of petitioners’ claim for punitive
damages,”  noting that the policies underlying the FAA do not overcome the218
wishes of the contracting parties.219
The Supreme Court rejected the argument of Shearson that the holding in
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson,  decided earlier in the same term,220
should be applied here to uphold the arbitration agreement, despite New York
common law providing that arbitrators may not award punitive damages.  221
It pointed out that the terms of the agreement between the contracting parties
are essential to delineating the limits of the application of the FAA’s pro-
arbitration policy.   Going back to its original premise that the contract222
provisions themselves are determinative, the Court examined that language.  223
Considering the choice of law and arbitration provisions separately, the Court
concluded that these provisions, in isolation, could be read in two ways: (1)
As a substitute for the analysis that would determine what state’s law to apply
and, under such an interpretation, no exclusionary intent could be found and,
accordingly, punitive damages would be permitted to be awarded by the
arbitrator because the FAA would preempt New York’s Garrity Rule (no
arbitral awards of punitive damages); or (2) More than a substitute for
traditional conflict of laws analysis because of the caveat “detached from
otherwise-applicable federal law” and, under such interpretation, the provision
would include only New York’s substantive law and not allocation of
authority between alternative tribunals and, as such, punitive damages would
not be precluded in the arbitral setting.   Under either analysis, the Court224
concluded, the choice of law provision was no “unequivocal exclusion of
Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1976), superseded by statute, Federal Arbitration Act, 9
U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000).
217. Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 55 (citing Lee v. Chica, 983 F.2d 883 (8th Cir. 1993);
Barbier v. Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc., 948 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1991); Raytheon Co. v.
Automated Bus. Sys., Inc., 882 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1989); Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 835
F.2d 1378, 1386-88 (11th Cir. 1988); Pierson v. Dean, Witter, Reynolds, Inc., 742 F.2d 334
(7th Cir. 1984)).
218. Id. at 58.
219. Id. at 57.
220. 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
221. Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 55-56.
222. Id. at 57 (citing Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489
U.S. 468 (1989)).
223. Id. at 58-59.
224. Id. at 59-60.
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punitive damages claims.”   The Court also said the arbitration clause,225
considered in isolation, implicates the propriety of an arbitral award of
punitive damages because it authorizes arbitration under NASD rules which
allow the award of “damages and other relief” by the arbitrators.   Using this226
analysis, the Court held that the arbitration provision was broad enough to
contemplate an award of punitive damages and contradicted any indication of
an attempt to foreclose claims for punitive damages.227
The Court concluded that while the choice of law clause may introduce
ambiguity into the agreement otherwise allowing punitive damages, under the
Volt decision the construction and interpretation of such arbitration provisions
must be done in light of the federal policy favoring arbitration, resolving
ambiguities as to the scope of the arbitration provision in favor of
arbitration.   Likewise, the Court mentioned that ambiguous language is to228
be construed against Shearson which drafted the language in question.229
After observing that the Client Agreement makes no reference to the
question of recoverability of punitive damages, the Supreme Court focused,
first separately and then conjunctively, on the arbitration and choice of law
provisions in the Client Agreement.   The Court reasoned that Shearson’s230
reading of the two clauses failed to give effect to all of the provisions and
failed to render them consistent with each other.   The Court concluded that231
the best way to harmonize the choice of law provision with the arbitration
provision was to interpret “laws of the State of New York” to mean the
substantive principles that New York courts would apply but not include
special rules limiting the authority of arbitrators.   Accordingly, the Court232
held that the court of appeals had misinterpreted the agreement and the arbitral
award of punitive damages should be enforced.233
225. Id. at 60.
226. Id. at 61 (quoting NAT’L ASS’N OF SEC. DEALERS, CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE
¶ 3741(e) (1993)).
227. Id. at 61.
228. Id. at 62 (citing Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. 489
U.S. 468, 476 (1989)).
229. Id. at 62 (citing United States v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203, 210 (1970); U.S. Fire Ins.
Co. v. Schnackenberg, 429 N.E.2d 1203, 1205 (Ill. 1981); Graff v. Billet, 477 N.E.2d 212, 213-
14 (N.Y. 1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1981)). 
230. Id. at 58-60.
231. Id. at 63.
232. Id. at 63-64.
233. Id. at 64.
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VII. Potential Limitations on Bruner’s Reach 
Those desirous of advancing the minority view that the FAA is inapplicable
to an arbitration clause in a nursing home contract have already begun to cite
Bruner in support of this proposition.   On the other hand, those wanting to234
resist these efforts may attempt to distinguish Bruner based on what appears
to be the opinion’s self-limiting language.  In holding the FAA inapplicable
and not preemptive of the anti-arbitration provisions of the Oklahoma Nursing
Home Care Act,  the Oklahoma Supreme Court placed great emphasis on the235
language of the agreement calling for the application of Oklahoma law.   The236
court went to great lengths to point out that the arbitration agreement did not
reference the FAA but in a number of places did recognize the applicability
of Oklahoma law.   One would anticipate that in many instances arising in237
later litigation, the arbitral provision in question will specifically provide for
the applicability of the FAA.   In fact, under the holding in Volt, even parties238
to arbitral provisions which do not involve interstate commerce can agree to
the applicability of the FAA.239
Another important factor in finding that the FAA was not applicable was
the court’s conclusion that “the evidence in this case is insufficient to connect
the nursing home admission contract with interstate commerce under extant
jurisprudence from the United States Supreme Court.”   It is apparent that240
one of the primary factors compelling this particular conclusion was that
parties on both sides of this litigation had direct and exclusive contacts with
Oklahoma.   In reaching its conclusion that the defendant’s proof was241
insufficient to establish a substantial affect on interstate commerce, the court
apparently balanced that proof on the one hand against the proof that Mrs.
Bruner was an Oklahoma resident, the nursing home was an Oklahoma limited
partnership, the nursing home’s principal place of business was in Oklahoma,
and the nursing home was licensed by the state of Oklahoma.   The242
234. See supra text accompanying note 2. 
235. 63 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1-1901 to -1939 (2001).
236. Bruner v. Timberlane Manor Ltd. P’ship, 2006 OK 90, ¶ 47, 155 P.3d 16, 32. 
237. See supra note 71.
238. See, e.g., Rainbow Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Crutcher, No. 07-CV-194-JHP, 2008 WL
268321, at *6 (N.D. Okla. Jan. 29, 2008) (distinguising Bruner on the grounds that the
arbitration provision at issue there called for the application of Oklahoma law, whereas the
parties in Crutcher selected the FAA to govern, and on the additional basis that the Crutcher
admission agreement evidenced “a transaction involving interstate commerce”).  
239. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478-
79 (1989); see also In re Alamo Lumber Co., 23 S.W.3d 577, 579 (Tex. App. 2000).
240. Bruner, ¶ 47, 155 P.3d at 32.
241. Id. ¶ 42, 155 P.3d at 31.
242. Id.
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exclusivity of these Oklahoma contacts will likely also be used to distinguish
Bruner in subsequent cases.
VIII. Conclusion
The aforementioned case-specific factors notwithstanding, the holding in
Bruner was ultimately founded on the conclusions that the FAA was
inapplicable because the contract failed to evidence a transaction that in the
aggregate was a general practice subject to control under the Commerce
Clause with a substantial impact on interstate commerce.   Rejecting243
jurisprudence of the supreme courts of Texas, Alabama, and Mississippi, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court concluded that the distribution of Medicare and
Medicaid funds does not evidence an effect on interstate commerce subject to
federal control under the Commerce Clause.   That is the linchpin of the244
court’s decision and the import of this holding cannot be marginalized by the
case-specific factors referred to above.  Further evidence of the determination
of this court to enforce the anti-arbitration provisions of the Oklahoma
Nursing Home Care Act can be found in dicta contained in the penultimate
paragraph of its opinion, where the court said that even if the admission
contract was within the reach of the Commerce Clause, the mandate of the
FAA “has been overridden by a contrary congressional command.”245
Nursing home cases are hotly contested, high-stakes litigation, often
yielding record jury verdicts.  Many times the seminal—and exquisitely
important—question is whether a jury or a panel of arbitrators will be “the
decider.”  This issue is so important as to be worthy, in its own right, of much
litigation and legal scholarship.  For example, the three cases specifically
rejected by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Bruner: McGuffey Health &
243. Id. ¶ 43, 155 P.3d at 31.
244. Id. ¶¶ 44-45, 155 P.3d at 31.
245. Id. ¶ 46, 155 P.3d at 31 (citing Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220,
226-27 (1987)).  The Oklahoma Supreme Court was apparently relying on the following
language in McMahon:
The Arbitration Act, standing alone, therefore mandates enforcement of
agreements to arbitrate statutory claims.  Like any statutory directive, the
Arbitration Act’s mandate may be overridden by a contrary congressional
command.  The burden is on the party opposing arbitration, however, to show that
Congress intended to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights
at issue.  If Congress did intend to limit or prohibit waiver of a judicial forum for
a particular claim, such an intent “will be deducible from [the statute’s] text or
legislative history,” or from an inherent conflict between arbitration and the
statute’s underlying purposes.
McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226-27 (citations omitted) (alteration in original).  
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Rehabilitation Center v. Gibson ex rel. Jackson,  In re Nexion Health at246
Humble, Inc.,  and Vicksburg Partners, L.P. v. Stephens  have been cited247 248
many times in both primary and secondary sources around the country.  249
While these cases have at times been distinguished, it appears that the only
case in which they have been specifically rejected is Bruner.   It is almost250
certain that Bruner will receive similar attention in the continuing battle over
the forum in which nursing home liability issues are to be decided.251
As can be seen from the cases discussed herein, a number of state
legislatures and courts have been persuaded that the arbitration of nursing
home liability issues should be limited, if not precluded.   For those cases252
falling within its ambit, the FAA provides otherwise and has been deemed to
trump contrary state legislation.   The broader concern raised by the holding253
of the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Bruner is the impact of this significant
limitation on the applicability of the FAA on the purposes and benefits of that
statute.  In its opinion, the Oklahoma Supreme Court pointed out that the
United States Supreme Court has yet to address the relationship between the
provision of Medicare and Medicaid benefits and the existence of an effect on
interstate commerce sufficient to trigger the application of the preemptive
aspects of the FAA.   Perhaps, due to the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s ruling254
in Bruner, the Court will take the opportunity to do so sooner, rather than
later.
246. 864 So. 2d 1061 (Ala. 2003).
247. 173 S.W.3d 67 (Tex. 2005). 
248. 911 So. 2d 507 (Miss. 2005).
249. According to the Westlaw database, last searched March 22, 2008, McGuffey, 864 So.
2d 1061, had citing references showing fifty-six documents; Nexion Health, 173 S.W.3d 67, had
citing references showing 133 documents; and, Vicksburg Partners, 911 So. 2d 507, had citing
references showing 197 documents. 
250. Bruner, 2006 OK 90, 155 P.3d 15.
251. According to the Westlaw database, last searched March 22, 2008, Bruner, 2006 OK
90, 155 P.3d 15, already had citing references showing forty-two documents.
252. See supra notes 32, 39-40, 72, 111, 123, 142, 163-188 and accompanying text.
253. See supra Part III.
254. See supra text accompanying note 67.
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